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%\setbeamertemplate{headline}[textline]{Johnson & Koyama}
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\title[]{\Large \color{Blue}\textbf{Taxes, Lawyers, and the Decline of Witchcraft in France}\\
\large {}\color{Blue} \color{Black}\normalsize\\}

\institute[]{\large Noel D. Johnson and Mark Koyama  \\ \bigskip \small{George Mason University}}
\date{\small{10 October, 2011}}


\begin{document}


\frame{\titlepage}


\section{Introduction}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Introduction:  Smith vs. Hobbes}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\vspace{-20pt}
\includegraphics[scale=0.50]{SmithVsHobbes.png}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Introduction:  Smith vs. Hobbes}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[scale=0.45]{LeviathanFront.png}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Introduction:  Smith vs. Hobbes}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\vspace{-20pt}
\includegraphics[scale=0.75]{Figure1.pdf}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Introduction:  Smith vs. Hobbes}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\vspace{-20pt}
\includegraphics[scale=0.35]{ReceptionConde.png}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Introduction:  Smith vs. Hobbes}
\begin{itemize}
 \item  State capacity is an important determinant of economic performance:
 \smallskip
 \item Large literature in sociology \citep{Weber22,Tilly90,Kiser01b}. \smallskip
 \item \citet{Bockstette02} and \citet{Putterman07} observe a relationship between state capacity and subsequent growth.  
 \item However, we know little about the process through which increases in fiscal capacity affects broader outcomes, like \textbf{legal capacity}.   \smallskip
\item \citet{Besley09b, Besley11} theorize that fiscal and legal capacity are \textbf{complements}.
 \end{itemize}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Introduction:  Smith vs. Hobbes}
\begin{itemize}
\item Large literature uses Britain as a benchmark as it was the first industrial nation \citep{Brewer88,Obrien05}.
\bigskip
\item However, the British path to modern economic growth was unique.
\bigskip
\item Specifically, Britain, or at least, England had a highly centralized elite from the middle ages onwards \citep{Dincecco09,  Bogart11}.
\bigskip
\item Rest of Europe was highly fragmented.  \smallskip 
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Introduction:  Smith vs. Hobbes}
\begin{columns}
\begin{column}[c]{7cm}
We focus on early modern France
\begin{itemize}
  \item  Fiscal and Legal fragmentation were closely related and costly
\smallskip
   \item   There were multiple tax authorities.  Rouen to Nantes thirty tolls. \citep{Heckscher55a, Johnson06} 
   \smallskip
    \item   ``...we have more laws in France than in the rest of the world put together...  so much is left to the opinion and decision of our judges that never was their liberty more unshackled....''  -Montaigne (d. 1592)
 \end{itemize}
\end{column}
\begin{column}[c]{5cm}
\includegraphics[scale=0.40]{Map3.pdf}
\end{column}
\end{columns}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Introduction:  Smith vs. Hobbes}
\begin{columns}
\begin{column}[c]{7cm}
\textbf{Within} region fragmentation is prodigious:  Haute-Auvergne \citep{Greenshields94}
\begin{itemize}
  \item  Between 1587 and 1664 one royal pr\'{e}sidial court, five local baillage courts and 15 mar\'{e}chaux for about 175,000 inhabitants.
   \smallskip
   \item   As a result, many crimes handled by local nobility who also manipulated the laws to their advantage.
   \smallskip
   \item  For example, many seigneuries had their own weights and measures within their territory \citep{Greenshields94,  Hamscher76}.
 \end{itemize}
\end{column}
\begin{column}[c]{5cm}
\includegraphics[scale=0.25]{auvergne.png}
\end{column}
\end{columns}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Introduction:  Smith vs. Hobbes}
\begin{quote}
``Prolonged witch hunting is as good a barometer as any for measuring weakness in a state'' \citep{Soman89}
\end{quote} 
\begin{itemize}
  \item  Little consistent data on deviation of locally enforced rule of law from `modern' standards of procedure.
  \smallskip
  \item  We use witch trials as a proxy of legal capacity in the early modern period.
  \smallskip
   \item   A simple theoretical model and historical evidence suggest that the rise of the fiscal state led to the decline in witch trials.
   \smallskip
   \item  We find that witch trials and fiscal capacity are strongly correlated in panel data set.  
 \end{itemize}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Introduction:  Smith vs. Hobbes}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\vspace{-20pt}
\includegraphics[scale=0.75]{Figure1.pdf}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Introduction:  Smith vs. Hobbes}
\begin{figure}
\vspace{-20pt}
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[scale=0.37]{Figure2Maximal.png}\label{}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\vspace{-10pt}
\textcolor{red}{French witch trials decline before trials elsewhere.  Why?}
\end{frame}

\section{Witch Trials}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Witch Trials}
\textcolor{blue}{European Witch Hunt peaked during the age of Shakespeare, Descartes and Newton}
\smallskip
\begin{columns}
\begin{column}[c]{6.8cm}
\begin{itemize}
  \item  20,000--40,000 executions between 1450--1750.
\smallskip
   \item   No consensus as to why it began or why it ended. 
   \smallskip
    \item   Witch hunt  was fiercest in ``border lands''.  Organized states put an end to uncontrolled witch-hunting \citep{Levack06, Soman78}.
\end{itemize}
\end{column}
\begin{column}[c]{5.5cm}
\includegraphics[scale=0.30]{witchburning.png}
\end{column}
\end{columns}
\bigskip
\pause \textcolor{red} {We claim that the witch trials can be used as a proxy for lack of legal development}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Witch Trials}
\textcolor{blue}{Two components of the early-modern definition of witchcraft}
\bigskip
\begin{columns}
\begin{column}[c]{6cm}
\center{\includegraphics[scale=0.23]{maleficia.png}} \smallskip
\center{\textcolor{red}{Maleficia}}
\end{column}
\begin{column}[c]{6cm}
\center{\includegraphics[scale=0.70]{Goya.jpg}} \smallskip
\center{\textcolor{red}{Diabolism}}
\end{column}
\end{columns}
\end{frame}



\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Witch Trials}
\begin{itemize}
\item Witchcraft (especially diabolism) left no physical evidence.
\item  Most legal codes restricted use of torture (e.g. Ordinance of Villiers Cotterets (1539)).
\item  Circumstantial evidence, at least, required for implementation of torture \citep{Langbein76}.  
\item  Demonologists argued that judges and magistrates should relax legal standards in witchcraft cases. 
\end{itemize}
\pause
\textcolor{red}{According to Jean Bodin:}  
\begin{quote}
\textcolor{red}{\dots proof of such evil is so obscure and difficult that not one of a million witches would be accused and punished if regular legal procedure were followed. \citep[quoted in][19]{Midelfort72}}
\end{quote}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Witch Trials}

\begin{itemize}
\item   Witch-fears sparked trials but fear of witches was endogenous:
  \begin{quote}
\dots [s]uccessful witch-trials confirmed to potential accusers the presence of witches, encouraging them to act. Rather than allaying local fears, witch-hunts spread them \citep[80]{Gaskill10}.
\end{quote}
\item Trials begat more trials:
\begin{quote}
The news of witch-hunts and executions in other parts of a country could easily fan popular and elite fears and create a mood that was conducive to witch-hunting in a village or town \citep[53]{Levack06}. 
\end{quote}
\pause
\textcolor{red}{Hence a trial in one area could cascade causing more trials in nearby regions} 
\end{itemize}

\end{frame}



\section{Model}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Model}
\textcolor{blue}{Want the model to capture the following...}
\bigskip
\begin{itemize}
\item Witch trials required a deviation from ``official'' legal procedure
\smallskip
\item Witch accusations often came from below (or at least had popular support)
\smallskip
\item Belief in witches was reinforced by nearby trials
\smallskip
\item Magistrates faced trade-off when deciding whether to prosecute: \textcolor{red}{{Accommodate popular belief vs. Disorder}}
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Model}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textcolor{blue}{Not really interested in explaining why the central authority \textbf{asserts control over legal system} when attempting to increase fiscal capacity.}
\bigskip
\item \textcolor{blue}{We are interested in why the central authority might impose a \textbf{stricter interpretation of legal procedure} than local authority.}
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Model}

\begin{itemize}
\item Two regions $i \in \{1, 2 \}$, each under the authority of a local court: $l_{i}$. 
\item  Popular demand for witch trials is denoted by $d_{i}^{*} \in \mathbb{R}^{+}$
\item  Each local authority chooses the extent to which it will accommodate popular belief by allowing a deviation from formal legal procedure so as to try witches $s_{i}^{l} \in \mathbb{R}^{+}$.
\item Deviation from formal procedures comes with a cost of $\gamma$. 
\end{itemize}
The local authority minimizes the following quadratic loss function:
\begin{equation}\label{local}
\min_{s_{i}^{l}} u_{i}^{l} =  \frac{(s_{i}^{l} - d^{*})^{2}}{2} + \frac{\gamma (s_{i}^{l})^{2}}{2} \, .
\end{equation}

\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} A Model}

\begin{itemize}
\item Bottom-up demand for witch trials depends on local belief in witches, $\theta$, which in turn depends on a parameter, $\omega$, which reflects bad weather and other exogenous shocks and another term, $\beta s_{j}$, reflecting the externality created by trials in neighboring jurisdictions. $$  d_{i}^{*} (\theta_{i}) =  \omega + \beta s_{j} \, , $$
\smallskip
\pause
\item The symmetric Nash equilibrium when the central court does not intervene is: 
\begin{equation}
 \hat{s}^{l}_{i} = \hat{s}^{l}_{j} = \frac{\omega} {(1 + \gamma - \beta)} \, .
 \end{equation}
Which is increasing in $\beta$ for $\beta \in (0, 1)$.
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} A Model}
If the central authority intervenes in both territories, then it internalizes the ``belief externality'' by solving $$ \min_{s_{i}^{c}, s_{j}^{c} }  u_{i}^{l} =  \Big[\frac{(s_{i}^{l} - d^{*})^{2}}{2} + \frac{\gamma (s_{i}^{l})^{2}}{2} \Big] + \Big[\frac{(s_{j}^{c} - d^{*})^{2}}{2} + \frac{\gamma (s_{j}^{c})^{2}}{2} \Big] \, $$
\\ \smallskip
The optimal number of sentences is given by
\begin{equation}
\color{blue}{\hat{s}^{c} = (1-\beta) \Big[\frac{\omega}{1+ \gamma - \beta} \Big] = (1-\beta)\hat{s}_i^l} \, .
\end{equation}
 \\  \smallskip \pause
\textcolor{red}{Result: The central authority permits (weakly) fewer deviations from formal legal procedure and, thus, fewer witchcraft trials than does that local court:  $s^{l}_{i} \geq  s_{i}^{c}$ for $i \in \{ 1, 2 \}$. }
\end{frame}



\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Model}
\center{\textcolor{blue}{The case of the apprentice weaver Bacqu\'{e}}}
\bigskip
\begin{columns}
\begin{column}[c]{6.8cm}
\begin{itemize}
  \item  In Gascony two local judges took young Bacqu\'{e} to over thirty villages.
\smallskip
   \item   Villagers would line up while Bacqu\'{e} declared each a witch or not.
   \smallskip
    \item   He ``identified'' about 6,210 witches in this way.
    \smallskip
      \item  Henri Pussort, uncle of J.B. Colbert intervened.
\end{itemize}
\end{column}
\begin{column}[c]{5.5cm}
\includegraphics[scale=0.25]{Gascony.png}
\end{column}
\end{columns}
\bigskip
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Model}
\center{\textcolor{blue}{The case of the apprentice weaver Bacqu\'{e}}}
\bigskip
\begin{columns}
\begin{column}[c]{5cm}
\begin{itemize}
  \item  Pussort's efforts to stop the trial were blocked by nobles at Versailles.
\smallskip
   \item   Took the intervention of Colbert himself to have Bacqu\'{e} transferred to Bastille and witch trials stopped.
   \end{itemize}
\end{column}
\begin{column}[c]{7cm}
\includegraphics[scale=0.17]{Versailles.png}
\end{column}
\end{columns}
\bigskip
\end{frame}



\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Model}
Colbert ultimately stopped the affair by annulling all previous prosecution through a royal edict which...
\bigskip
\begin{quote}
\bigskip
\dots prevents the courts and averts the disorders that would be caused by a procedure so irregular that it would envelop the majority of inhabitants of the aforementioned province, trouble the repose of families, and violate the \textbf{rules of justice} \dots
\end{quote}
\end{frame}



\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Model}
This model consistent with other types of criminal behavior.  Any crime whose legitimacy is increased by others' beliefs and in which evidence is difficult to evaluate.  For example \dots
\bigskip
\begin{itemize}
\item Arson
\smallskip
\item Tax Evasion
\smallskip
\item Infanticide
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Model}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[scale=0.43]{AmandaKnox3.png}\label{}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\end{frame}


\section{Data}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Data}
\begin{itemize}
\item  We would like to identify whether fiscal capacity and legal capacity were correlated across time and space in 16th and 17th century France
 \bigskip
\item We proxy fiscal capacity with real per capita tax receipts from the most important direct tax, the Taille.
 \bigskip
\item We proxy legal capacity by the number of witch trials in a given region.
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Data}
\vspace{-20pt}
\center{\textcolor{blue}{Witch Trial Data}}
\begin{columns}
\begin{column}[c]{7cm}
\begin{itemize}
\item Base data on 2,261 witch trials in France between 1550-1700 was collected from various primary and secondary sources by Marc Carlson.
\smallskip
\item We also create a ``maximal'' data set with an additional 572 trials from various sources (\textbf{Not in paper})  
\smallskip
\item We recoded these data to correspond to the appropriate tax region (\textit{g\'{e}n\'{e}ralit\'{e}s}).
 \end{itemize}
\end{column}
\begin{column}[c]{5cm}
\includegraphics[scale=0.35]{Map2.pdf}
\end{column}
\end{columns}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Data}
\vspace{-20pt}
\center{\textcolor{blue}{Witch Trial Data}}
\begin{columns}
\begin{column}[c]{7cm}
\begin{itemize}
\item We omit the Swiss territories (Geneva, Neuch\^{a}tel, and Belfort) and Lorraine despite their close links to French institutions. 
\smallskip
\item Also omit North Eastern trials listed as Nord since it was vague what tax region (if any, they belong too).
\smallskip
\item Finally, dropped 530 trials from Gascony in 1607 that were falsely attributed to Pierre de Lancre.
\end{itemize}
\end{column}
\begin{column}[c]{5cm}
\includegraphics[scale=0.35]{Map2.pdf}
\end{column}
\end{columns}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Data}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[scale=0.75]{Figure2.pdf}\label{}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Data}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[scale=0.40]{Figure2Maximal.png}\label{}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Data}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[scale=0.40]{Figure2NoAlsace.png}\label{}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\end{frame}



\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Data}
\vspace{-20pt}
\center{\textcolor{blue}{Tax Revenue Data}}
\begin{columns}
\begin{column}[c]{7cm}
\begin{itemize}
\item The Tailles constituted between 1/3 and 2/3 of ordinary revenues between 1550 and 1700.
\smallskip
\item Collected at the G\'{e}n\'{e}ralit\'e level.  There were 33 G\'{e}n\'{e}ralit\'{e}s over the course of the 16th and 17th centuries.  We aggregate these into 21 consistent regions.
\smallskip
\item Missing tax data for 1657-1660 and 1550-1599.
\end{itemize}
\end{column}
\begin{column}[c]{5cm}
\includegraphics[scale=0.30]{Map1.pdf}
\end{column}
\end{columns}
\end{frame}




\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Data}
\textcolor{blue}{Regional tax data missing for 1550-1599.  We adopt two strategies:}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\vspace{-10pt}
\includegraphics[scale=0.22]{Figure5.png}\label{}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Data}
\begin{itemize}
\item Convert tax data into silver equivalents
\bigskip
\item Use population data from Dup\^{a}quier around 1700 to make per capita
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\vspace{-20pt}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[scale=0.38]{AppendixTableMaximal.png}\label{}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Witch Trials}
\begin{itemize}
\item Base Malet data set has 21 regions and 3 periods:  1550-1609, 1610-1649, 1650-1699.
\bigskip
\item Begin by creating a dichotomous variables =1 if there was at least one witch trial, =0 otherwise.
\bigskip
\end{itemize}
\pause
\begin{quote}
\textcolor{red}{\dots it is putting a very high price on one's conjecture to roast a man alive for them\dots \citep{Montaigne80}}
\end{quote}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Data}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\vspace{-10pt}
\includegraphics[scale=0.75]{BinaryBarChart.pdf}\label{}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\end{frame}




\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Data}
\begin{itemize}
\item Regions with greater fiscal capacity were less likely to prosecute witches.
\bigskip
\item The number of regions where trials were recorded declined from 12 in the 1550--1609 period to 3 in the 1660--1700 period. 
\bigskip
\item Average tax receipts in `witchcraft' regions remained constant.  Regions which were abandoning witch trials were doing so at the same time as their fiscal capacity was increasing. 
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}


\section{Econometrics}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Econometrics}
\begin{itemize}
\item We would like to control for time-variant unobservables common to all regions (e.g. changing mentalit\'es, weather, etc\dots) and region-specific time invariant factors (e.g. cultures, geography, etc\dots). 
\bigskip
\item  Begin by running logits on the dichotomous witch trial variable.
\bigskip
\item  Numbers in brackets are odds-ratios
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Econometrics}
\vspace{-20pt}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[scale=0.38]{LogitResults.png}\label{}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Econometrics}
\vspace{-20pt}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[scale=0.38]{partialregplotmaximal.png}\label{}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Econometrics}
\begin{itemize}
\item The count data on trials are over-dispersed (variance greater than mean).
\bigskip
\item We estimate a series of Negative Binomial Regressions using both the Malet and Forbonnais data sets.
\bigskip
\item Numbers in brackets are Incident Rate Ratios.
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Econometrics}
\vspace{-20pt}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[scale=0.38]{BaseMaletCount.png}\label{}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Econometrics}
\vspace{-20pt}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[scale=0.38]{BaseForbonnaisCount.png}\label{}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Econometrics}
\textcolor{blue}{As robustness checks\dots}
\begin{itemize}
\vspace{20pt}
\item Run count regressions on the ``Maximal'' data.
\bigskip
\item Run count regressions dropping the Alsace outlier.
\bigskip
\item Run count regressions using witch trials per capita.
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Econometrics}
\vspace{-20pt}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[scale=0.50]{Robustness.png}\label{}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Econometrics}
\vspace{-40pt}
\center{\textcolor{blue}{Instrumental Variables}}
\bigskip
\begin{columns}
\begin{column}[c]{6cm}
\begin{itemize}
\item Pays d'\'{e}tat had much more bargaining power over taxes than did Pays d'\'{e}l\'{e}ction.
\smallskip
\item Pays d'\'{e}tat were later additions to Monarchy and retained their representative bodies.
\smallskip
\item Our instrument is dichotomous variable =1 if Pays d'\'{e}tat and =0 if Pays d'\'{e}l\'{e}ction.
\end{itemize}
\end{column}
\begin{column}[c]{6cm}
\includegraphics[scale=0.50]{Map3.pdf}
\end{column}
\end{columns}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Econometrics}
\vspace{-20pt}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[scale=0.70]{InstrumentDescription.pdf}\label{}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Econometrics}
\vspace{-20pt}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[scale=0.31]{IVBaseMalet.png}\label{}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\end{frame}


\section{Edicts}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Edicts}
\begin{itemize}
\item Econometric results suggest increases in fiscal capacity were accompanied by improvements in legal capacity.
\smallskip
\item Were there actual changes in laws that accompanied this trend?
\smallskip
\item  Yes.  1604 Parlement of Paris requires all witch trials to be automatically appealed.  1629 Code Michau.  1682 Louis XIV issues edict banning witch trials.
\smallskip
\item Can we look more generally at whether the central authority was imposing itself on surrounding regions?
\smallskip
\item Under the direction of Colbert, all laws and edicts issued by the Crown since 1115 were compiled at the end of the seventeenth century.  We use this source to identify how legislatively active the crown was and what kind of legislation was being created.
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Edicts}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[scale=0.48]{TableChrono.png}\label{}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Edicts}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[scale=0.70]{EdictsOverTime.pdf}\label{}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Edicts}
\begin{itemize}
\item The period from 1550-1580 is just as active as 1630-1680.
\bigskip
\item What about the composition of laws being promulgated?
\bigskip
\item For 1576 and 1664 (two years with similar amounts of legislation) we count the number of laws falling into each of 8 categories.
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Edicts}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[scale=0.3]{EdictsComposition.png}\label{}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\pause
\textcolor{red}{Difference between 1576 and 1664 is the amount of legislation aimed at suppressing local rights and privileges.}
\end{frame}


\section{Conclusions}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Conclusions}
\begin{itemize}
\item In the middle of the seventeenth century the centralized state played an increasingly prominent role in coordinating the behavior of local legal jurisdictions.
\bigskip
\item  This is consistent with the work of \citet{Wallis11} and \cite{Olson00}
\bigskip
\item Also provides support for the claims of \citet{Besley09b, Besley11} that fiscal and legal capacity are complements.

\end{itemize}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Conclusions}
\begin{itemize}
\item The decline of witch trials in early modern France was driven less by changes in preferences (mentalit\'{e}s) than by a process of legal and fiscal centralization.
\bigskip
\item This supports the views of \citet{Soman89, Soman92} and \citet{Levack06} over those of \citet{Mandrou68b, Mandrou79}.
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Conclusions}
\begin{itemize}
\item In contrast to the traditional emphasis by economists on the importance of constraints on the centralized state \citep{Brennan80, North81, North89, Acemoglu05, AcemogluEtAl01}, our findings highlight the importance of increased state capacity for the development of a favorable institutional environment for economic growth.
\bigskip
\item Democracy is almost certainly desirable but, at least in France, we agree with \citet{Tocqueville98} that the centralizing policies of the Absolute Monarchy laid the foundations in the seventeenth century for what would eventually come to pass by the end of the eighteenth century \citep{Johnson06, Johnson09}.
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}



\section{Support}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Support}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[scale=0.43]{MaletDescStats.png}\label{}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Support}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[scale=0.43]{ForbDescStats.png}\label{}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Support}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[scale=0.47]{FranceCrimProcedure.png}\label{}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Support}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[scale=0.35]{Charges.png}\label{}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\end{frame}

{\scriptsize
\bibliographystyle{jmr}
\bibliography{noelref}}


\end{document}


















\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Was Fiscal Capacity Causal?}
\begin{itemize}

\item Econometric results  suggest increased in fiscal capacity were accompanied by improvements in legal capacity.

\item Unlikely that causality ran from witch trials to fiscal capacity.  Did improvements in legal capacity drive improvements in fiscal capacity?

\item We look at a more direct measure of legal capacity to shed light on this issue.

\item Under the direction of Colbert, all laws and edicts issued by the Crown since 1115 were compiled at the end of the seventeenth century.  We use this source to identify how legislatively active the crown was and what kind of legislation was being created.

\end{itemize}
\end{frame}





\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Royal Edits}

\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
%\includegraphics[scale=0.4]{witch7.pdf}\label{}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\begin{itemize}
\item Number of edicts between 1550 and 1679.
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Royal Edits}

\begin{itemize}
\item No correlation between the legal activism of the Monarchy and the increases in fiscal capacity that began in1630s.  

\itemThe period from 1550-1580 is just as active as 1630-1680.
 
\item What about the composition of laws being promulgated?

\item For 1576 and 1664 (two years with similar amounts of legislation) we count the number of laws falling into each of 8 categories.
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Composition of Edits}

\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
%\includegraphics[scale=0.4]{Edits2.pdf}\label{}


\end{center}
\end{figure}


\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Composition of Edits}

\begin{itemize}
\item The categories most easily associated with increases in state capacity are:
\begin{itemize}
\item[--]Regulations conerning health
\item[--] Laws concerning money supply
\item[--] Laws directly increasing fiscal capacity
\item[--] Laws directly increasing legal capacity
\item[--] Laws which suppress existing offices and privileges
\end{itemize}
\item The only significant difference in composition of laws between the early and late period is that there are a lot more offices and privileges being suppressed in 1664.

\item Consistent with our argument that the imposition of a new centralized legal order that accompanied the increase in fiscal capacity

\end{itemize}

\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Historical Narrative}
There is qualitative historical evidence that supports our argument that casuation ran from fiscal capacity $\rightarrow$ legal capacity $\rightarrow$ $\downarrow$ trials.

\begin{itemize}
\item The Parlement of Paris was much more reluctant to execute witches than were regional courts. 

\item Ò[v]illage judges in the region of Champagne-Ardennes were relying far too heavily on the  dubious practice of ÔswimmingÕ suspects on the slightest evidenceÓ (Soman, 1989, 6). 
\item ÒIn 1609 the Parlement of Bordeaux condemned to death a young man, a Protestant of Nerca, on his simple confession, without witnessesÓ (Lea, 1957, 1296-1297).
\end{itemize}

\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Conclusions}

State-building in early modern France led to greater fiscal and legal capacity. 
\begin{itemize}
\item Higher taxes reduced the welfare of the population (spent on warfare not public goods).
\item But the rationalized and centralized legal system that accompanied the expansion of the fiscal state was beneficial.  We argue that witchtrials are a proxy for this process. 
\item  The centralized elites who won out of local elites had broader interests.  Internalized externalities.  
\item This contributed towards 18th c. institutional change as Tocqueville argued.
\end{itemize}

\end{frame}



\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Introduction:  Smith vs. Hobbes}
\begin{itemize}
 \item  State capacity is an important determinant of economic performance:
  \smallskip
 \begin{enumerate} 
 \item Fiscal capacity.
 \item Legal capacity. 
 \end{enumerate} \smallskip
 \item Large literature on state capacity in sociology \citep{Weber22,Mann86,Tilly90,Kiser01b}. \smallskip
 \item However, we know little about the process through which a state acquires fiscal or legal capacity.   \smallskip
 \item \citet{Besley09b} theorize that fiscal and legal capacity are \textit{complements}. 
 \end{itemize}






\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Introduction}
\begin{itemize}
 \item  State capacity is an important determinant of economic performance:
  \smallskip
 \begin{enumerate} 
 \item Fiscal capacity.
 \item Legal capacity. 
 \end{enumerate} \smallskip
 \item Large literature on state capacity in sociology \citep{Weber22,Mann86,Tilly90,Kiser01b}. \smallskip
 \item However, we know little about the process through which a state acquires fiscal or legal capacity.   \smallskip
 \item \citet{Besley09b} theorize that fiscal and legal capacity are \textit{complements}. 
 \end{itemize}

\end{frame}




\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} 17th Century France}
\begin{itemize}
\item Large literature uses Britain as a benchmark as Britain was the first industrial nation \citep{Brewer88,Obrien05}.  \smallskip
\item However, the British path to modern economic growth was unique.  \smallskip
\item Specifically, Britain, or at least, England had a highly centralized elite from the middle ages onwards \citep{Dincecco09}.   \smallskip
\item Rest of Europe was highly fragmented.  \smallskip 
\item France offers an alternative laboratory to examine the relationship between fiscal and legal capacity and the emergence of the modern state and modern economic growth.
 \end{itemize}
\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Introduction}
\begin{columns}
\begin{column}[c]{6cm}
We focus on early modern France
\begin{itemize}
  \item  Fiscal and legal fragmentation imposed significant costs
\smallskip
   \item   There were multiple tax authorities.  Rouen to Nantes thirty tolls. (Heckscher, 1955; Johnson, 2006) 
   \smallskip
    \item   Legal fragmentation raised transaction costs.  (Rosenthal,  1992;  Hamscher, 1976)
 \end{itemize}
\end{column}
\begin{column}[c]{6cm}
\includegraphics[scale=0.45]{francemap.pdf}
\end{column}
\end{columns}

\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Introduction}
\begin{quote}
``Prolonged witch hunting is as good a barometer as any for measuring weakness in a state'' \citep{Soman89}
\end{quote} 
\begin{itemize}
  \item  We propose a new proxy of legal capacity in the early modern period: `witch trials'.  \smallskip
   \item  We find that witch trials and fiscal capacity are strongly correlated in panel data set.  
   \smallskip
    \item   A simple theoretical model and historical evidence indicates that the rise of the fiscal led to the decline in witch-trials. 
 \end{itemize}
\end{frame}


\section{The European Witchhunt}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} The European Witchhunt}

\begin{itemize}
\item The European Witchhunt peaked during the age of Shakespere, Descartes and Newton.    

\item 40,000 executions between 1450--1750.  

\item  No consensus as to why it began or why it ended. 

\item Witch hunt  was fiercest in poorly governed `border lands'.  Organized states put an end to uncontrolled witch-hunting once they saw how costly it was. 

\end{itemize}

\pause We argue that the witchhunts can be used as a proxy for legal development. 

\end{frame}





\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Rule of Law, Torture, and Witch-trials}

\begin{itemize}
\item Witchcraft left no physical evidence. Hence witches could not  be convicted in large-numbers without torture. 
\item  Most legal codes restricted  use of torture.  
\item Large-scale witch-hunts occurred when judges and magistrates relaxed legal standards in witchcraft cases. 
\item They did this because their fear of the witchcraft peril was great.
\end{itemize}

According to Jean Bodin:  
\begin{quote}
`proof of such evil is so obscure and difficult that not one of a million witches would be accused and punished if regular legal procedure were followed' \citep[quoted in][19]{Midelfort72}
\end{quote}

\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Trials and Witch Fears}

\begin{itemize}
\item   Witch-fears sparked trials but fear of witches was partly endogenous:
  \begin{quote}
`[s]uccessful witch-trials confirmed to potential accusers the presence of witches, encouraging them to act. Rather than allaying local fears, witch-hunts spread them' \citep[80]{Gaskill10}.
\end{quote}
\item Trials begat more trials:
\begin{quote}
`The news of witch-hunts and executions in other parts of a country could easily fan popular and elite fears and create a modo that was conducive to witch-hunting in a village or town' \citep[53]{Levack06}. 
\end{quote}
Hence a trial in one area could cascade causing more trials in nearby regions. 
\end{itemize}

\end{frame}



\section{Model}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} A Model}

\begin{itemize}
\item Two regions $i \in \{1, 2 \}$, each under the authority of a local court: $l_{}$. 
\item  Each local authority sets  $s^{l} \in \mathbb{R}^{+}$ based on its optimal sentence   
$s^{*} \in \mathbb{R}^{+}$. 
\item There is a cost of carrying out a sentence $\gamma$. 
\end{itemize}
We employ a quadratic utility function:
\begin{equation}\label{local}
\max_{s_{i}^{l}} u_{i}^{l} =  - \frac{(s_{i}^{l} - s^{*})^{2}}{2} - \frac{\gamma (s_{i}^{l})^{2}}{2} \, .
\end{equation}

\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} A Model}

\begin{itemize}
\item The optimal sentence $s^{*}$ is based on one's belief in witches.  This is effected the trials in the other region. $$  s_{i}^{*} (\theta_{i}) =  \omega + \beta s_{j} \, , $$
for all $i \in \{1, 2 \} $ and where $\omega$ represents an exogenous parameter.  This is the spill-over externality. 
\bigskip \pause
\item The symmetric Nash equilibrium when the central court does not intervene is: 
\begin{equation}\label{local2}
 \hat{s}^{l}_{1} = \hat{s}^{l}_{2} = \frac{(1 + \gamma + \beta) \omega} {(1 + \gamma)^{2} - \beta^{2}} \, .
 \end{equation}
This is increasing in $\beta$ for $\beta \in (0, 1)$.
\end{itemize}

\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} A Model}
The central court internalizes this externality and chooses the socially optimal sentences in both regions. 
\\ \smallskip
The optimal number of sentences is given by
\begin{equation}\label{central}
\hat{s}^{c} = \frac{(1 + \gamma + 3 \beta) (1 - \beta)\omega}{(1+ \gamma + \beta)^{2} - 4 \beta^{2}} \, .
\end{equation}
 \\  \bigskip
 This is decreasing in $\beta$ for $\beta \in (0, 1)$.
 \\  \smallskip \pause
\textbf{Proposition}: The central court always chooses a (weakly) lower sentence $s$ than does that local court:  $s^{l}_{i} \geq  s_{i}^{c}$ for $i \in \{ 1, 2 \}$. 

\end{frame}
\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Predictions}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
%\includegraphics[scale=0.45]{witchexample5.pdf}\label{s1}
%\caption[]{Local sentences $\hat{s}^{l}$ exceed sentences set by the central court $\hat{s}^{c}$. The difference: $\hat{s}^{l}-\hat{s}^{c}$ is increasing in $\beta$. Plotted for $\gamma = \omega = 1$.}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Data on Witch Trials and Fiscal Capacity}
\begin{itemize}
\item  We would like to identify whether fiscal capacity and legal capacity were correlated across time and space in 16th and 17th century France
 \bigskip
\item We proxy fiscal capacity with real per capita tax receipts from the most important direct tax, the Taille.
 \bigskip
\item We proxy legal capacity by the number of witch trials in a given region.

\end{itemize}

\end{frame}









\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Data on Witch Trials and Fiscal Capacity}
\begin{itemize}
\item The witch trial data for France between 1550-1700 was collected from various primary and secondary sources by Marc Carlson.

\item Data for ``Rest of Europe'' comes from \citet{Oster04} and includes data from England, Geneva, Scotland, parts of Germany, Finland, Estonia and Hungary.  

\item   Generally reports the village, city, or region of trial and number accused.  Sometimes also reports the outcome of the trial. 

\item We recoded these data to correspond to the appropriate tax region.

\item We omit the Swiss terrirtories (Geneva and Belfort) despite their close links to French institutions.  Also omit North Eastern trials listed as ÒNordÓ since it was vague what tax region (if any, they belong too).

\end{itemize}

\end{frame}

\begin{frame}


\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
%\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{witch1.pdf}\label{c1}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
French witch trials decline before trials elsewhere.  Why?
\end{frame}



\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Data on Witch Trials and Fiscal Capacity}
\begin{itemize}

\item The Tailles constituted between 1/3 and 2/3 of ordinary revenues between 1600 and 1700.

\item Collected at the Generalit\'e level.  There were 33 Generalit\'e over the course of the 16th and 17th centuries.  We aggregate these into 21 consistent regions.

\item Regional tax data are missing for 1550 to 1599.  We assume the regions had fiscal capacity similar to 1600-1610 during those years (consistent with agg. data in Gu\'ery).

\item Also missing tax data during last years of Fronde, 1650-1659.

\end{itemize}

\end{frame}



\begin{frame}


\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
%\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{witch2.pdf}\label{}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
Consistent with our hypothesis: fiscal capacity was expanding after 1635.  Could this have been driving the decline in witch trials? 
\end{frame}



\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Basic Results}

\begin{itemize}
\item We treat the witch trials data as binary. 
\item Regions with high levels of taxes were less likely to prosecute witches. 
\item The number of regions where trials were recorded declined from 12 in the 1550--1610 period to 3 in the 1660--1700 period. 
\item Average tax receipts in `witchcraft' regions remained constant.  Regions which were abandoning witch trials were doing so at the same time as their fiscal capacity was increasing. 
\end{itemize}


\end{frame}



\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Basic Results}

\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
%\includegraphics[scale=0.48]{timeline.pdf}\label{}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\begin{itemize}
\item We aggregate the yearly data into three periods corresponding to 1550--1610, 1611--1650, and 1651--1695.  We then have a panel with $T=3$, $n=21$, and $N=63$.

\item For robustness, we create both a dichotomous witch trial variable ($=1$ if $ >0$  trials, $=0$ if no trials) and a count variable.
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}



\begin{frame}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
%\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{Table1.pdf}\label{}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
%\includegraphics[scale=0.48]{witch3.pdf}\label{}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
\begin{itemize}
\item  Regions with high fiscal capacity unlikely to try witches. 
\item  Fiscal capacity in `witchcraft' regions did not increase but n.of `witchcraft' regions declined. 
\item Regions increased fiscal capacity at the same time as trials ended.
\end{itemize}

\end{frame}


%\begin{frame}
%\frametitle{\color{Blue} Descriptive Statistics}


%\begin{figure}
%\begin{center}
%\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{witch4.pdf}
%\end{center}
%\end{figure}

%\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue} Econometric Analysis}

We would like to control for time-trends (changing mentalit\'es) and region-specific time invariant factors. 
\begin{itemize}
\item  We also estimate the effect of fiscal capacity on the number of trials in a region.

\item The count data on trials is over-dispersed (variance greater than mean).  Thus, Poisson is not appropriate.

\item We estimate a series of Negative Binomial Regressions with time dummies.  We also implement fixed effects and random effects.

\item Numbers in brackets are Incident Rate Ratios.

\end{itemize}


\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Econometric Analysis}


\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
%\includegraphics[scale=0.45]{Logit1.pdf}\label{}


\end{center}
\end{figure}

\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Econometric Analysis}


\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
%\includegraphics[scale=0.45]{Logit2.pdf}\label{}


\end{center}
\end{figure}

\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Econometric Analysis}


\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
%\includegraphics[scale=0.45]{Logit3.pdf}\label{}


\end{center}
\end{figure}

\end{frame}


\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Econometric Analysis}


\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
%\includegraphics[scale=0.45]{Count1.pdf}\label{}


\end{center}
\end{figure}

\end{frame}

\begin{frame}
\frametitle{\color{Blue}  Econometric Analysis}


\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
%\includegraphics[scale=0.45]{Count2.pdf}\label{}


\end{center}
\end{figure}

\end{frame}







