

# The Effects of Land Redistribution: Evidence from the French Revolution

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## ONLINE APPENDIX

### A1.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<b>Dependent Variables</b>					
Average Farm Size in 1862	194	9.48	5.25	2.86	23.15
Elevation Range	194	473.94	503.88	54	3536
Land Artificial Prairie 1852	194	0.10	0.06	0.00	0.22
Land Fallow 1852	194	0.20	0.10	0	0.43
Wheat Hectares in 1841	194	9.43	0.93	3.67	10.68
Wheat Yield in 1841	194	2.54	0.30	1.90	3.24
Number of Pipe Manufacturers in 1856	194	5.40	4.38	0.00	24.00
Sharecroppers 1852	194	0.34	0.32	0	0.99
<b>Explanatory Variables</b>					
Percent Confiscated	194	5.90	5.87	0.00	40.1
<i>Controls</i>					
Market Access 1789	194	13.52	0.26	13.00	14.52
Wheat Suitability	194	3.78	1.21	1.33	8
<b>Instrument</b>					
Distance to Bishopric	194	15694.10	1516.26	0.00	61592.25

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics

### A1.2 SAMPLE SELECTION

An empirical challenge we face is that our data on land confiscations cover only about a third of the districts in France. As all of the results we report in the main text of the paper use only districts for which we have data, this does not challenge the validity of our analysis. However, to the extent one would wish to generalize our findings to the rest of France, there could be concerns with the comparability of the districts for which we have data and those we do not. This prompts us to compare the observable characteristics of the districts with data on land confiscations and those where the data are missing in Table A2.

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Table A2: Balance of Samples With vs. Without Data on Confiscations

Note: This table reports coefficients and standard errors for regressions comparing the observable characteristics of the districts with data on land confiscations and those whose data are missing under various specifications. Significance for two-sided hypothesis tests: \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

In Table A2, we investigate the correlation between each variable and a dummy variable equal to one if the district is in our sample. In Column (1), we explore the bivariate correlations (in separate regressions for each variable) and in Column (2), we repeat the regressions from Column (1) while controlling for the twelve district fixed effects. For Columns (1) and (2), each coefficient represents a separate regression. In Column (3), we present the coefficients of a multivariate regression while Column (4) contains the coefficients of a multivariate regressions with regional dummy variables. We first show that there is no correlation between a district's suitability for wheat cultivation and whether it is in our sample. The second regression (in Row 2) shows there is also no correlation between districts in our sample and potato cultivation suitability. We also examine whether the difference between the maximum and minimum elevation in a district differs across samples since, as we discussed above, elevation is a potentially important predictor of likelihood to invest in drainage. Under the bivariate regression, elevation range is not a significant predictor of sample; however it is correlated with sample once the twelve region fixed effects are included. In the multivariate FE regression in column (4), the coefficient on the elevation barely statistically significant at conventional levels.

We are particularly concerned that locations which are more economically viable may either be more likely to be in our sample, or that within our sample, the Church may have owned more land in more economically viable places. This could potentially reduce our ability to generalize our results out of sample. In Table A2 our measure of market access in 1789 is strongly correlated with being in sample in the bivariate regression (Column 1) and the multivariate regression (Column 3). This makes sense given that our confiscations data were compiled, in part, from separate regional studies which were biased towards well-known or economically central locations (?). However, once we include region fixed effects (Columns 2 and 4) the correlation between market access and sample disappears. Nonetheless, we will be careful to condition on market access in all of our main regressions below.

Despite the generally supportive results in Table A2, it is important to keep in mind that all of our regressions in the main text of the paper use only the sample for which we have information on Revolutionary confiscations (sample=1). Our identifying assumption for these regressions is that, conditional on being in sample, there is no systematic relationship between Revolutionary confiscations and the various outcomes we investigate. Conditional on our controls, region dummies, and IV strategy described below, the possibility of such selection is minimized.

### A1.3 DISTRICT REVENUES

Table A3: Percent Land Confiscated and District Revenues in 1880, 1900.

## A1.4 ADDITIONAL MAPS




Figure A1: Construction of 25km buffer around the districts.  
Note: Circles represent pipe manufacturers. Source: Authors' computations.




Figure A2: Auction Plot Locations.

Note: Sample used in regressions includes districts with bold border.

Source: Tableau des biens à vendre (Tableau, 1791).




Figure A3: Bishoprics in 1600




Figure A4: Correlation between distance to 1600 bishopric and Revolutionary confiscations.




Figure A5: Distribution of average farm sizes above and below mean confiscations in 1862.




Figure A6: The effect of Revolutionary confiscations on agricultural productivity over time.